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Abstract 
The present research examines whether forming implementation intentions can help 
people with social anxiety to control their attention and make more realistic appraisals of 
their performance. In Experiment 1, socially anxious participants (relative to less anxious 
participants) exhibited an attentional bias toward social threat words in a Visual Dot Probe 
task. However, socially anxious participants who formed implementation intentions 
designed to control attention did not exhibit this bias. Using a spatial cuing task, 
Experiment 2 showed that forming implementation intentions also promoted rapid 
disengagement from threatening stimuli. Experiment 3 ruled out the possibility that 
implementation intentions were effective merely because they provided additional goal-
relevant information. In Experiment 4, participants gave a speech and subsequently rated 
their performance. Forming implementation intentions prevented the underestimation of 
performance that characterises socially anxious individuals. Together, the findings suggest 
that forming implementation intentions may provide an effective means of handling self-
regulatory problems in social anxiety. 
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Using Implementation Intentions to Overcome the Effects of Social Anxiety on 
Attention and Appraisals of Performance 
Numerous theories suggest that differences in attentional responses to threat-related 
stimuli are an important feature of anxiety disorders (for a review, see Bar-Haim, Lamy, 
Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007). For example, the cognitive 
model of social phobia (Clark & Wells, 1995) suggests that the primary fear among 
socially anxious individuals’ is negative evaluation and, as such, they are vigilant for signs 
that they are being evaluated. Once these evaluative cues are detected (e.g., the person 
observes a colleague looking at them), Clark and Wells argue that attention is directed 
toward interoceptive information such as physiological cues that are indicative of anxiety 
(e.g., an increased heart rate, feelings of blushing, sweating, or dizziness). People with 
social anxiety then use this interoceptive information to infer how they appear to others 
(e.g., “I am blushing, so my colleague will think that I am stupid”). 
In an illustrative experiment, Musa, Lepine, Clark, Mansell, and Ehlers (2003) 
asked participants with social phobia to undertake a variant of the Visual Dot Probe task 
(VDP; MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). Two words were presented simultaneously on a 
computer screen and one was replaced by either the letter ‘E’ or the letter ‘F’. Participants’ 
task was to indicate which letter was presented. Some words represented social threat (e.g., 
stupid, pathetic) whereas others were neutral words matched for length and frequency. A 
measure of attention to social threat was derived by comparing reaction times to probes that 
replaced social threat versus neutral words, based on the rationale that detection latencies 
are shorter in the attended area. Consistent with the idea of an attentional bias toward social 
threat information, participants with social phobia responded faster to probes replacing 
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threat words than to probes replacing neutral words, whereas this attentional bias was not 
observed amongst participants who did not have social phobia.  
Although there is some debate concerning the nature of the attentional difficulties in 
social anxiety – for example, when faces rather than words are used as threat-related cues 
people with social anxiety appear to direct attention away from threat (Chen, Ehlers, Clark, 
& Mansell, 2002; Mansell, Clark, Ehlers, & Chen, 1999) – it is clear that when confronted 
with potential threat, people with high levels of social anxiety direct their attention in a 
different manner compared to people without social anxiety. These attentional differences 
are significant because they (a) reduce the person’s ability to process benign social cues 
and reappraise the situation as non-threatening and (b) convince the person that they appear 
anxious to others or that they have performed poorly (for a review, see Bögels & Mansell, 
2004). The implication is that strategies that promote the effective self-regulation of 
attention are a potentially useful avenue for reducing social anxiety (Bögels & Mansell, 
2004; Rapee, Gaston, & Abbott, 2009). 
Control of Social Anxiety Effects via Implementation Intentions 
Self-regulation of social anxiety’s characteristic effects on attention and judgment is 
likely to prove difficult, however, because such responses are over-learned and exhibit 
features of automaticity (Bargh, 1994). For instance, there is evidence that attentional 
responses in social anxiety occur relatively immediately (Mogg & Bradley, 2002; 
Ononaiye, Turpin, & Reidy, 2007), efficiently (Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 
1990; Mansell, Clark, & Ehlers, 2003; Wenzel, 2006), and without conscious intent 
(Wikström, Lundh, & Westerland, 2003; Mogg & Bradley, 2002; Ononaiye et al., 2007). 
This means that just giving oneself the goal, “do not focus on threatening information” may 
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not be sufficient to offset the impact of social anxiety. A good example is the emotional 
Stroop task (Gotlib & McCann, 1984). Despite being motivated to name the ink colour of 
social threat words, people with social anxiety struggle to ignore the meaning of the words 
(e.g., Hope et al., 1990).  
Although merely holding a strong intention to obtain a goal does not guarantee goal 
attainment (Webb & Sheeran, 2006), research suggests that forming an implementation 
intention (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006) enhances the likelihood of 
translating goal intentions into action. Implementation intentions are plans that specify the 
when, where, and how of reaching one’s goal in advance. These plans take the format, “If 
situation Y arises, then I will perform goal-directed response Z!” Thus, to reach the goal of 
appearing confident in a social situation, implementation intentions would specify both a 
good opportunity to further goal pursuit (e.g., “If I am introduced to someone at a party…”) 
and a suitable response to enact in this situation (e.g., “…then I will smile and ask if they 
have travelled far”). Evidence that implementation intentions promote effective goal 
striving comes from a meta-analysis that found a medium-to-large effect of implementation 
intention formation on goal attainment (d+ = 0.65, 94 studies) over and above the impact of 
goal intention strength (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006).  
To date, however, only one study has shown that forming implementation intentions 
can control affective states. Schweiger Gallo, Keil, McCulloch, Rockstroh, and Gollwitzer 
(2009, Experiment 1) showed participants a series of disgusting images from the 
International Affective Picture System (Lang & Öhman, 1988). Participants were either 
given no instructions, asked to form goal intentions (“I will not get disgusted!”), or asked to 
form goal intentions plus an implementation intention (“If I see blood, then I will remain 
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calm and collected!”). Findings showed that participants who formed implementation 
intentions reported lower arousal when confronted with disgusting stimuli compared to the 
other two groups. Subsequent experiments indicated that participants who formed 
implementation intentions also reported less negative affect and had reduced objective 
arousal (according to the P1 electrocortical index) in response to frightening stimuli. Thus, 
planning engendered more effective emotion regulation compared to forming mere goal 
intentions.  
The Present Research 
The present research extends previous implementation intention research in two key 
respects. First, no previous studies have assessed the potential benefits of implementation 
intentions in aiding self-regulation by socially anxious persons. Such a test seems 
worthwhile given the prevalence and disruptive consequences of social anxiety. Moreover, 
because the effects of social anxiety on attention exhibit features of automaticity, this 
context affords a stern test of the capacity of implementation intentions to aid self-
regulation. Second, whereas Schweiger-Gallo et al. (2009) assessed the impact of 
implementation intentions on experienced emotion (assessed via electrocortical or self-
report measures), the present studies extend this line of enquiry by assessing the impact of 
implementation intentions on the cognitive consequences (attention, judgment) of a chronic 
affective state (social anxiety). The prediction tested here is that implementation intention 
formation can overcome the characteristic negative impact of social anxiety on both 
attentional responses and appraisals of performance.  
 Four experiments were conducted to test this prediction. In each experiment, 
participants were divided into those with low versus high levels of social anxiety. The low 
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social anxiety participants served as the control group and, with the exception of 
Experiment 2, only received basic task instructions. The high social anxiety participants 
were randomly allocated to one of three conditions that either received only basic task 
instructions, were assigned the goal to control their anxiety, or were assigned the anxiety 
control goal and also formed an implementation intention specifying when and how to 
direct their attention during the task. The first three experiments adopted key cognitive 
paradigms used by researchers studying attentional processes (e.g., Fox, Russo, Bowles, & 
Dutton, 2001; Musa et al., 2003) and tested whether implementation intentions can 
overcome the biased responses associated with social anxiety. The final experiment 
investigated whether forming an implementation intention that specified how to direct 
attention during a speech task could promote more realistic appraisals of speech 
performance.  
Experiment 1: Strategic Direction of Attention in a Dot Probe Task 
Experiment 1 adopted the VDP task to compare orienting of attention to social 
threat between high and low social anxiety participants. Prior to the task, one-third of the 
high social anxiety participants formed an implementation intention to focus attention 
exclusively on neutral stimuli, one-third received no instructions, and the remaining one-
third were explicitly asked to try to remain calm. All of the low social anxiety participants 
received no instructions about controlling anxiety or attention and served as the control 
group. The prediction was that, without implementation intentions, participants with high 
levels of social anxiety – relative to participants with low levels of social anxiety – would 
show an attentional bias toward words representing social threat even if they were 
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explicitly asked to remain calm. However, we predicted that this bias would not be 
observed when high social anxiety participants formed implementation intentions. 
Method 
Participants 
Undergraduate students were sent an e-mail inviting them to complete an online 
version of the Social Avoidance and Distress scale (SAD; Watson & Friend, 1969). A 
sample of the participants with scores of less than 4 (N = 15, MSAD = 1.80, SDSAD = 1.61) or 
greater than 9 (N = 38, MSAD = 15.79, SDSAD = 5.30) comprised the low and high social 
anxiety groups, respectively. Participants were predominantly female (64.15%), had a 
mean age of 23.62 years (SD = 8.84), and were compensated £5 for their time.
1
 
Design and Procedure 
The experiment adopted a 4-between (condition: low anxiety-no instruction, high 
anxiety-no instruction, high anxiety-goal intention, high anxiety-implementation intention) 
design. On arrival at the laboratory, all participants were informed about the general aims 
of the study and then completed the Fear of Negative Evaluation scale (FNE; Watson & 
Friend, 1969), the Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker (PRCS; Paul, 1966), and the 
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). 
Creating a Social Evaluative Situation  
When participants had completed the questionnaires, they were sat at a computer 
and asked to follow the instructions. The first screen informed participants; “The next part 
of this experiment is an assessment of your social skills and public speaking ability. After a 
short computer task you will be asked to give a speech on a controversial topic that will be 
given to you. You will then have 3 minutes to prepare for the speech. The experimenter will 
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watch you give your speech and will rate the effectiveness of your presentation. A video 
camera will also record your speech so that, later, some expert psychologists can make 
ratings of your ability as well. Right, now it is time to start the computer task. One final 
note is that your performance here today on all tasks has been shown to predict your 
general intelligence. You will be given full feedback on this after the experiment.” These 
instructions have been reliably shown to increase state anxiety in a number of studies (e.g., 
Mansell et al., 1999). A video camera was set up on a tripod to the right side of the 
participant. Although this camera did not contain a tape, a recording light was turned on to 
enhance the realism of the situation. 
The Dot-Probe Task 
Participants then undertook a differentiation variant of the VDP (Salemink, van den 
Hout, & Kindt, 2007). Participants were told; “The next part of the experiment is a 
computer task. You will see two words on the screen, one above the other. One of these 
words will be replaced by an E or by an F. Your task is to press the pink key marked E if 
the letter E appears and the yellow key marked F if the letter F appears. You need to do 
this as quickly and as accurately as possible.” Following a central fixation cross for 
500ms, a pair of words was presented for 500ms.  Words were presented in upper case 
letters and were 3cm apart on the screen (above and below fixation). Thirty-two words 
representing social threat (e.g., criticised, failure) and 32 neutral words matched for length 
and frequency of use in the English language (e.g., ingredient, balance) were taken from 
the word lists composed by Ononaiye et al. (2007).
2
 An additional 32 neutral word pairs 
were also included giving a total of 64 word pairs (see Appendix 1). Following presentation 
of the words, there was a 25ms delay before a probe (E or F) replaced one of the words. 
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The probe remained on the screen until the participant responded. Finally, to maintain 
vigilance, there was a randomly selected delay (500ms or 1250ms) before the next trial. 
Each of the 64 word pairs was presented twice (in a random order with the probe replacing 
a different word each time) giving a total of 128 trials. The position of the social threat and 
neutral words (upper or lower) was also counterbalanced. 
Manipulation of Goal Intention and Implementation Intentions 
Following 28 practice trials with neutral word pairs, high social anxiety participants 
received instructions depending on the condition to which they had been assigned. 
Participants in the ‘goal intention’ condition were told; “During the computer task, it is 
important that you remain calm and do not worry about the speech”. High social anxiety 
participants in the ‘implementation intention’ condition were given the same instructions as 
participants in the goal intention condition, but were also asked to form a plan; “If I see a 
neutral word, then I will focus all my attention on it!” Finally, participants in the ‘no 
instruction’ condition were given no further instructions about what to do during the 
computer task. Participants with low levels of social anxiety also received no further 
instructions. Upon completion of the VDP task, all participants were debriefed, told that 
they performed very well on the task, and would not have to give a speech. 
Results 
Following the recommendations of Fox et al. (2001) the response latency data was 
filtered by removing any responses faster than 100ms or more than 2.5 standard deviations 
from each participant’s mean. Only response latencies for correct trials (when the 
participant accurately reported that the probe was an E or an F) were included in the 
calculation of attentional bias scores to ensure that the participant had seen the probe. The 
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average error rate across all 64 threat trials was low (M = 2.45%). Response latencies were 
converted into attentional bias scores (cf. MacLeod et al., 1986) using the equation: 
0.5 x [(UpLt – UpUt)] + [(LpUt – LpLt)] 
Where U = upper position, L = lower position, p = probe, t = threat word. 
In this equation UpLt, for example, represents a participant’s mean response latency 
to trials in which a probe appears in the upper position of the screen (Up) with a threat 
word in the lower position of the screen (Lt). Positive attentional bias scores reflect a bias 
toward threatening words, whereas negative attentional bias scores reflect a bias away from 
threatening words.  
Attentional bias scores were submitted to a 4-between (condition: low anxiety-no 
instruction, high anxiety-no instruction, high anxiety-goal intention, high anxiety-
implementation intention) ANOVA (see Figure 1). The main effect of condition was 
significant, F(3, 49) = 4.66, p < .01, eta
2
 = .22. Pairwise comparisons revealed that high 
social anxiety participants given no instructions showed a greater attentional bias toward 
words representing social threat (M = 15.54, SD = 5.21) than did low social anxiety 
participants (M = -7.80, SD = 4.85), F(1, 28) = 8.59, p < .01, eta
2
 = .25, thus replicating the 
characteristic impact of social anxiety on attention to social threat information. There was 
no difference between the attentional bias scores of high social anxiety participants given 
no instructions (M = 15.54, SD = 5.21) and high social anxiety participants who formed 
goal intentions (M = 9.33, SD = 5.42), F(1, 23) = 0.63, ns, eta
2
 = .03. However, the 
attentional bias scores of high social anxiety participants who formed implementation 
intentions (M = -4.13, SD = 5.21) were significantly lower than both high social anxiety 
participants given no instructions (M = 15.54, SD = 5.21), F(1, 24) = 6.03, p < .05, eta
2
 = 
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.20, and high social anxiety participants who formed goal intentions (M = 9.33, SD = 5.42), 
F(1, 23) = 4.50, p < .05, eta
2
 = .16. There was no difference between the attentional bias 
scores of high social anxiety participants who formed implementation intentions (M = -
4.13, SD = 5.21) and low social anxiety participants (M = -7.80, SD = 4.85), F(1, 26) = 
0.29, ns, eta
2
 = .01.      
Discussion 
Experiment 1 used a VDP task to investigate attentional processing under 
conditions of social evaluative threat. As expected, participants with high levels of social 
anxiety (relative to participants with low levels) preferentially directed attention toward 
words representing social threat. This attentional bias was observed even when high social 
anxiety participants formed a goal intention to remain calm. However, high social anxiety 
participants who supplemented the goal intention to remain calm with a specific plan to 
focus their attention on neutral stimuli were able to prevent this attentional bias from 
influencing their responses. In fact, high social anxiety participants who formed an 
implementation intention showed equivalent responses to low social anxiety participants. In 
summary, the findings of Experiment 1 replicate and support previous research into 
attentional biases in social anxiety (e.g., Musa et al., 2003), and provide the first evidence 
that implementation intentions can overcome the characteristic effects of social anxiety on 
attention. 
Experiment 2: Strategic Disengagement of Attention in a Cuing Paradigm 
Fox et al. (2001) argued that the attentional biases observed among people with 
high levels of anxiety reflect slow disengagement of attention from threat-related stimuli, 
rather than fast initial orienting. Furthermore, accumulated evidence supports the idea that 
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the attention of people with social anxiety is more likely to be held by threat-related words 
than by neutral words (Amir, Elias, Klumpp, & Przeworski, 2003; Fox et al., 2001; Yiend 
& Mathews, 2001). Thus, we wanted to investigate whether implementation intentions 
could facilitate rapid disengagement from information representing social threat among 
people with social anxiety. Experiment 2 adopted an emotional spatial cuing task 
developed by Fox et al. (2001) to investigate this hypothesis. 
Experiment 2 also compared two different types of implementation intention. 
Whereas task-facilitating plans specify an optimal strategy for executing the behavior and 
take the form “If situation Y arises, then I will perform the task in this [specified] way!”, 
anxiety-inhibiting plans specify that one will ignore a particular anticipated internal or 
external cue that could derail goal pursuit (Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998). Anxiety-inhibiting 
plans have the format “If situation Y arises, then I will ignore it in this [specified] way!” A 
number of studies attest to the benefits of both facilitating plans (e.g., Webb & Sheeran, 
2003) and inhibiting plans (e.g., Achtziger, Gollwitzer, & Sheeran, 2008), but the two 
forms of if-then planning have been compared only once in an unpublished manuscript 
(Schaal & Gollwitzer, 1997). Finally, Experiment 2 adopted a fully crossed design in order 
to investigate the effect of planning among low as well as high socially anxious 
participants. Although implementation intentions have proved effective across a range of 
samples, there is also evidence that effects are moderated by the presence of a volitional 
problem – implementation intentions are more effective when people experience difficulty 
regulating their behaviour (see Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006, for a review). Therefore, we 
may find that implementation intentions have greater effects among high, relative to low, 
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socially anxious participants because only high socially anxious participants struggle to 
disengage their attention from social threat information. 
Method 
Participants 
Undergraduate students completed an online version of the SAD and a sample of 
those scoring less than 4 (N = 81, MSAD = 2.33, SDSAD = 1.63) or greater than 9 (N = 77, 
MSAD = 16.05, SDSAD = 5.26) on the SAD comprised the low and high social anxiety 
groups, respectively. Participants were predominantly female (57.59%), had a mean age of 
21.13 years (SD = 4.51), and were compensated £5 for their time. 
Design and Procedure 
The experiment adopted a 2-between (social anxiety group: low vs. high) by 4-
between (condition: control, goal intention, anxiety-inhibiting plan, task-facilitating plan) 
design. On arrival at the laboratory, all participants completed the SAD a second time 
along with the FNE, PRCS and STAI-T. A social evaluative context was created in an 
identical manner to Experiment 1.  
The Emotional Spatial Cuing Task 
Following the social evaluative manipulation, participants undertook a replication 
of Fox et al.’s (2001, Experiment 5) paradigm with the exception that the threat-related 
words reflected social threat rather than general threat (see Appendix 2). An asterisk 
(fixation) appeared in a box in the centre of the screen for 1000ms. Next, the asterisk was 
replaced by either a threat-related word or a matched neutral word. Finally, 600ms after 
presentation of the word a probe (either a ‘4’ or an ‘8’) was presented for 50ms either 
3.5cm to the right, to the left, above, or below the centrally presented word. Participants’ 
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task was to press either the 4 or the 8 key to indicate which probe had been presented. The 
cue word remained at fixation until the participant responded. 
Each participant completed a practice block of 48 trials (6 neutral words were 
followed by all possible combinations of probe and location) and then four blocks of 128 
trials (32 social threat and 32 neutral words were followed by all possible combinations of 
probe and location). Trials were presented in a random order. 
Manipulation of Goal Intention and Implementation Intentions 
Following the practice trials, participants in the ‘goal intention’ condition were told; 
“during the computer task, it is important that you remain calm and do not worry about the 
speech”. Participants in the ‘task facilitating implementation intention’ condition were 
asked to supplement their positive intentions with a specific plan; “If I see a word, then I 
will look out for the number 4 or 8 appearing around the box!” Participants in the ‘anxiety-
inhibiting implementation intention’ condition were asked to form the plan; “If I see a 
word, then I will ignore it’s meaning!” Participants in the ‘no instruction’ group received 
no further instructions. 
Results 
Error trials and any responses faster than 100ms or more than 2.5 standard 
deviations from that participant’s mean were removed (see Fox et al., 2001). The average 
error rate across all trials was low (4.21%). Reaction times were submitted to a 2-between 
(social anxiety group: low vs. high) by 2-between (implementation intentions: formed vs. 
not formed) by 4-between (condition: control, goal intention, anxiety-inhibiting plan, task-
facilitating plan) by 2-within (cue type: social threat vs. neutral) nested ANOVA (the effect 
of condition was nested within the higher order effect of implementation intentions). The 
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main effects of cue type, F(1, 150) = 1.49, ns, eta
2
 = .01, social anxiety group, F(1, 150) = 
0.21, ns, eta
2
 = .00, and condition (nested within implementation intention conditions), F(2, 
150) = 0.02, ns, eta
2
 = .00, were all non-significant (see Figure 2). The main effect of 
implementation intentions was marginally significant, F(1, 150) = 3.57, p = .06, eta
2
 = .02, 
Participants who formed implementation intentions responded marginally faster to all 
probes (M = 391, SD = 70) than did participants who did not form implementation 
intentions (M = 412, SD = 71). However, the effect of implementation intentions was 
qualified by a significant three-way interaction between cue type, social anxiety group, and 
implementation intentions, F(1, 150) = 4.53, p < .05, eta
2
 = .03. None of the other 
interactions reached significance, all Fs < 1.00. 
In order to decompose the three-way interaction, we first examined the two-way 
interaction between cue type and social anxiety group when participants had formed versus 
not formed implementation intentions. The interaction was marginally significant when 
participants had not formed implementation intentions, F(1, 73) = 3.53, p = .06, eta
2
 = .05, 
but was non-significant when participants formed an if-then plan specifying how to control 
their attention, F(1, 81) = 1.32, ns, eta
2
 = .02. Simple main effects revealed that cue type 
only influenced reaction times when highly socially anxious participants had not formed 
implementation intentions, F(1, 30) = 6.17, p < .05, eta
2
 = .17. High socially anxiety 
participants without plans responded slower to probes appearing around social threat words 
(M = 416, SD = 58) than to probes appearing around neutral words (M = 412, SD = 57). 
Cue type did not influence reaction times among low socially anxiety participants who did 
not form implementation intentions, F(1, 43) = 0.25, ns, eta
2
 = .01 (Ms = 409 and 410, 
respectively, both SDs = 80) and, crucially, did not influence reaction times among high 
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socially anxious participants who formed implementation intentions, F(1, 45) = 0.19, ns, 
eta
2
 = .00 (Ms = 393 and 394, SDs = 73 and 74, respectively). 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 used an emotional spatial cuing task to investigate attentional 
disengagement under conditions of social evaluative threat. High social anxiety participants 
who had not formed an implementation intention took longer to identify probes that 
appeared after words relating to social threat than did low social anxiety participants. This 
slowed response was not observed when probes were presented alongside neutral words, 
suggesting that high social anxiety participants struggled to disengage attention from 
stimuli representing social threat in particular. The same attentional difficulties were 
observed when participants were explicitly instructed to remain calm and not to worry 
about the speech. However, consistent with the idea that implementation intentions can be 
used to strategically facilitate shifts in attention away from threat-related cues, the nature of 
the word (social threat versus neutral) did not influence responses when participants had 
formed an implementation intention. High social anxiety participants who formed 
implementation intentions identified probes that appeared after social threat words just as 
quickly as probes that appeared after neutral words.  
There was no difference between the effects of anxiety-inhibiting and task-
facilitating plans. This finding supports previous research on the efficacy of both task-
facilitating and temptation-inhibiting implementation intentions (e.g., Achtziger et al., 
2008; Schaal & Gollwitzer, 1997; Webb & Sheeran, 2003) and suggests that there is some 
flexibility in how plans are targeted at particular volitional problems (Gollwitzer, Parks-
Stamm, Jaudas, & Sheeran, 2007).  Although forming implementation intentions 
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marginally sped up the responses of both low and high social anxiety participants, 
implementation intention formation only reduced the impact of social threat on the 
responses of high social anxiety participants. This moderation occurred because only high 
social anxiety participants experienced difficulties disengaging their attention from social 
threat information. Therefore, the findings replicate the often reported moderation of 
planning effects by the presence of a volitional problem – implementation intentions are 
helpful mainly when people experience difficulty regulating their behaviour (see 
Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006, for a review). 
Experiment 3: Specific Goal Intentions versus Implementation Intentions  
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that by forming implementation intentions people 
with social anxiety no longer exhibit two attentional biases with respect to social-threat 
information that characterise their anxiety – namely, heightened vigilance and slower 
disengagement. However, it is possible to claim that participants in the implementation 
intention conditions were given more information about the upcoming task than were 
participants in the goal intention and control conditions (e.g., that neutral words would be 
presented or that it might be beneficial to ignore the meaning of the words). To rule out this 
interpretation of implementation intention effects, it is therefore necessary to include a 
‘specific goal intention’ condition that receives equivalent information to that provided in 
the implementation intention condition, but does not use the “if (situation), then (goal-
directed response)” format of an implementation intention (Oettingen, Hönig, & 
Gollwitzer, 2000, Study 3). We predicted that the attentional bias would be greater in both 
standard goal intention and specific goal intention conditions compared to the 
implementation intention condition – because strong links are forged between the (social 
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threat) opportunity and (bias-alleviating) response only when the defining “if (situation), 
then (goal-directed response)” format of implementation intentions is used.  
Method 
Participants 
Undergraduate students completed an online version of the SAD and a sample of 
those scoring less than 4 (N = 14, MSAD = 2.36, SDSAD = 1.34) or greater than 9 (N = 51, 
MSAD = 18.57, SDSAD = 4.55) comprised the low and high social anxiety groups, 
respectively. Participants were predominantly female (69.23%), had a mean age of 20.65 
years (SD = 4.51), and were compensated £5 for their time. 
Design and Procedure 
The experiment adopted a 4-between (condition: low anxiety-standard goal 
intention, high anxiety-standard goal intention, high anxiety-specific goal intention, high 
anxiety-implementation intention) design. On arrival at the laboratory, all participants 
completed the SAD a second time along with the FNE, PRCS, and STAI-T. Participants 
were then informed that they would have to give a 3-minute speech in the same manner as 
Experiment 1 and 2. 
The Dot-Probe Task 
Participants then undertook a differentiation variant of the VDP similar to that used 
in Experiment 1. The only difference was that each threat-related word was paired with a 
matched furniture word (see Appendix 3). There were 48 word pairs in total; 16 threat-
related words matched with furniture words and an additional 32 neutral word pairs. Each 
word pair was presented twice giving a total of 96 trials. 
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Manipulation of Goal Intention and Implementation Intentions 
 Following 8 practice trials with neutral word pairs, participants received 
instructions depending on the condition to which they had been assigned. Participants with 
low social anxiety and high social anxiety in the ‘standard goal intention’ condition were 
told that “Research has shown that anxiety can influence peoples’ ability to perform well 
on the computer tasks that you will do today and can also influence peoples’ ability to give 
a good speech. Therefore, during all the tasks, it is important that you remain calm.” High 
social anxiety participants in the ‘specific goal intention’ condition were also told that 
“People become anxious because their thoughts stray to how well they are doing and how 
they appear to others.  To stay calm and to keep your thoughts on track, clinical 
psychologists have shown that it is useful to focus your attention on neutral features of the 
situation, such as the furniture. Furniture is a good focus of attention because it is present 
in virtually every social situation that you are likely to encounter. In this computer task you 
should try to focus on words that describe items of furniture (e.g., ‘trunk’, ‘daybed’, 
‘console’).” Finally, high social anxiety participants in the ‘implementation intention’ 
condition received the same information as those in the specific goal intention condition, 
but were also asked to form a plan to control their attention during the task; “If I see 
furniture, then I will focus all my attention on it!”  
Results 
Attentional bias scores were computed as in Experiment 1. The average error rate 
across the 32 threat trials was low (M = 4.52%). Attentional bias scores were submitted to a 
4-between (condition: low anxiety-standard goal intention, high anxiety-standard goal 
intention, high anxiety-specific goal intention, high anxiety-implementation intention) 
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ANOVA (see Figure 3). The main effect of condition was significant, F(3, 61) = 3.49, p < 
.01, eta
2
 = .15. Pairwise comparisons revealed that high social anxiety participants who 
formed standard goal intentions showed a greater attentional bias toward words 
representing social threat (M = 10.15, SD = 15.02) than did low social anxiety participants 
given the same instructions (M = -7.20, SD = 22.37), F(1, 29) = 6.62, p < .05, eta
2
 = .19; 
again, the characteristic impact of social anxiety levels on attention to social threat 
information was replicated. There was no difference between the attentional bias scores of 
high social anxiety participants given standard goal intentions (M = 10.15, SD = 15.02) and 
high social anxiety participants who formed specific goal intentions (M = 11.02, SD = 
29.95), F(1, 32) = 0.01, ns, eta
2
 = .00. However, the attentional bias scores of high social 
anxiety participants who formed implementation intentions (M = -14.67, SD = 38.13) were 
significantly lower than both high social anxiety participants who formed standard goal 
intentions (M = 10.15, SD = 15.02), F(1, 32) = 6.23, p < .05, eta
2
 = .16, and high social 
anxiety participants who formed specific goal intentions (M = 11.02, SD = 29.95), F(1, 32) 
= 4.77, p < .05, eta
2
 = .13. There was no difference between the attentional bias scores of 
high social anxiety participants who formed implementation intentions (M = -14.67, SD = 
38.13) and low social anxiety participants given standard goal intentions (M = -7.20, SD = 
22.37), F(1, 29) = 0.42, ns, eta
2
 = .01.      
Discussion 
Experiment 3 was designed to rule out the possibility that the effect of forming 
implementation intentions observed in Experiments 1 and 2 could be attributed to 
additional task information. As in Experiments 1 and 2, a subset of the participants with 
high levels of social anxiety were instructed to form an implementation intention to focus 
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their attention on the non-threatening stimuli (“If I see furniture, then I focus all my 
attention on it!”). However, in Experiment 3 we compared the effects of planning 
instructions with specific goal intention instructions that provided the same information 
(i.e., to try to focus on furniture), but not in an “if (situation), then (goal-directed 
response)” format. As expected, high social anxiety participants evidenced an attentional 
bias for threat-related information that was not observed among low social anxiety 
participants. This attentional bias was observed even when socially anxious participants 
received specific instructions to focus on furniture. Only high social anxiety participants 
who formed implementation intentions were able to overcome this attentional bias. This 
finding replicates Experiment 1 and provides further evidence to suggest that goal 
intentions, even when relatively specific, do not suffice to control attentional responses 
among individuals with high levels of social anxiety. 
Experiment 4: Promoting Realistic Appraisals of Performance during a Speech Task 
Experiments 1 - 3 used computer-based measures to investigate whether 
implementation intention formation could prevent the well-documented impact of social 
anxiety on attention. In Experiment 4 we investigated whether forming implementation 
intentions can overcome another characteristic outcome of social anxiety, namely, 
unrealistic appraisals of performance. Rapee and Lim (1992) found that social phobics 
systematically underestimated their performance on a speech task relative to less anxious 
participants and similar findings have also been reported among samples with non-clinical 
levels of social anxiety (e.g., Rapee & Hayman, 1996, Study 2). Thus, the aim of 
Experiment 4 was to investigate whether forming implementation intentions could reduce 
the discrepancy between self-ratings and observer-ratings of speech performance. Low and 
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high social anxiety participants gave a speech and formed a plan specifying how to direct 
their attention if they felt concerned during the speech. On the basis of Clark and Wells 
(1995) cognitive model of social phobia and the findings of our first three experiments, we 
hypothesised that forming implementation intentions would prevent the shift of attention 
toward physiological cues that are indicative of social anxiety (e.g., an increased heart rate) 
and, as a consequence, the person would no longer use these cues to make inferences about 
their performance. Thus, we predicted that the performance appraisals of high social 
anxiety participants who formed implementation intentions should be less negative than the 
appraisals of comparably anxious participants who did not form implementation intentions. 
Method 
Participants 
Undergraduate students completed an online version of the SAD and a sample of 
those scoring less than 4 (N = 18, MSAD = 3.17, SDSAD = 1.30) or greater than 9 (N = 57, 
MSAD = 14.95, SDSAD = 4.95) comprised the low and high social anxiety groups, 
respectively. Participants were predominantly female (54.67%), had a mean age of 21.12 
years (SD = 2.45), and were compensated £5 for their time. 
Design and Procedure 
The experiment adopted a 4-between (condition: low anxiety-no instruction, high 
anxiety-no instruction, high anxiety-goal intention, high anxiety-implementation intention) 
by 2-within (rater: self vs. observer) design. On arrival at the laboratory, all participants 
completed the SAD a second time along with the FNE, PRCS, and STAI-T. Participants 
were then informed that they would have to give a 3-minute speech on a topic that would 
be given to them (for instructions, see Experiment 1). In an effort to raise social evaluative 
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concerns further, participants watched a video of another participant giving a speech 
(actually a confederate) and rated the participant’s performance on the following items: 
“How good was the speaker?”, “How interesting was the speaker?”, “Did the speaker 
appear confident?”, and “How helpful do you think the speech would be to the intended 
audience?” Finally, participants were asked what they would criticize about the speaker’s 
presentation. 
Manipulation of Goal Intention and Implementation Intentions 
 Next, all participants were reminded that they would have to give their own speech. 
High social anxiety participants were then randomly allocated to one of three conditions. 
Participants in the ‘no instruction’ condition were given no instructions about controlling 
anxiety. High social anxiety participants in the ‘goal intention condition’ were told that 
“Some people become anxious while speaking because they expect that others will think the 
worst of them. During the speech you should try to remain calm and not worry about how 
you appear to others. Research has shown that if you are not focusing your attention on 
yourself during the speech, it will help you to keep calm.” High social anxiety participants 
in the ‘implementation intention condition’ were given the same instructions, but were also 
asked to form the following plan; “If I feel concerned, then I will focus on the back wall of 
the room!”  
All participants were then told that the topic for their speech would be ‘What advice 
would you would give to someone who was going for an important job interview?’ and that 
they had three minutes to think about what they would say. Once the three minutes were 
up, participants were asked to stand in front of the video camera and to deliver their speech. 
They were told that the experimenter would stop them after three minutes.  
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Self- and Observer-ratings of Speech Performance 
 Following the speech, participants were asked to rate their performance using 12 
items from the Perception of Speech Performance scale (Rapee & Lim, 1992): ‘My content 
was understandable’, ‘I kept eye contact with the audience’, ‘I stuttered’, ‘I fidgeted’, ‘I 
“Um”ed and “Ah”ed’, ‘I had a clear voice’, ‘My face twitched’, ‘My voice quivered’, ‘I 
appeared confident’, ‘I appeared nervous’, ‘I kept the audience interested’, and ‘I generally 
spoke well’. Participants were provided with a 5-point scale anchored by ‘not at all’ and 
‘very much’ with which to respond (Cronbach’s alpha = .86). Two independent coders 
(blind to condition) watched the videos of the speeches and scored each participant’s 
performance on the same 12 items with the same 5-point scale anchored by ‘not at all’ and 
‘very much’ (Cronbach’s alpha = .82). Inter-rater reliability was of medium magnitude 
(Cohen, 1992; mean Pearson r = .35) and coder ratings were averaged.  
Results 
Total scores on the Perception of Speech Performance scale were submitted to a 4-
between (condition: low anxiety-no instruction, high anxiety-no instruction, high anxiety-
goal intention, high anxiety-implementation intention) by 2-within (rater: self vs. observer) 
repeated measures ANOVA (see Figure 4). There were significant main effects of 
condition, F(3, 71) = 4.61, p < .01, eta
2
 = .16, and rater, F(1, 71) = 238.44, p < .001, eta
2
 = 
.77, that were qualified by a significant two-way interaction between condition and rater, 
F(3, 71) = 7.30, p < .001, eta
2
 = .24. Simple main effects revealed a main effect of 
condition on self-ratings of performance, F(3, 71) = 7.21, p < .001, eta
2
 = .23, but not on 
observer-ratings of performance, F(3, 71) = 1.20, ns, eta
2
 = .05. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that high social anxiety participants given no instructions rated their performance 
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as worse (M = 17.54, SD = 7.75) than did low social anxiety participants (M = 26.78, SD = 
7.61), F(1, 42) = 15.34, p < .001, eta
2
 = .27. To facilitate interpretation we also calculated 
discrepancy scores by subtracting the sum of the self-ratings from the sum of the observer 
ratings. The consequence of poor performance ratings was that high social anxiety 
participants given no instructions showed a greater discrepancy between self- and observer-
ratings of performance (M = 15.52, SD = 6.84) than did low social anxiety participants (M 
= 8.08, SD = 5.31).  
There was no difference between the self-ratings of high social anxiety participants 
given no instructions (M = 17.54, SD = 7.75) and high social anxiety participants who 
formed goal intentions (M = 20.88, SD = 4.91), F(1, 40) = 2.37, ns, eta
2
 = .06, and, as a 
consequence, both groups of participants showed a comparable discrepancy between self- 
and observer-ratings of performance (Ms = 15.52 and 13.81, SDs = 6.84 and 6.97, 
respectively).  However, high social anxiety participants who formed implementation 
intentions rated their performance as better (M = 24.20, SD = 5.96) than did high social 
anxiety participants given no instructions (M = 17.54, SD = 7.75), F(1, 39) = 8.24, p < .01, 
eta
2
 = .17, and marginally better than did high social anxiety participants who formed goal 
intentions (M = 20.88, SD = 4.91), F(1, 29) = 2.89, p < .10, eta
2
 = .09. There was no 
difference between the self-ratings of high social anxiety participants who formed 
implementation intentions (M = 24.20, SD = 5.96) and low social anxiety participants (M = 
26.78, SD = 7.61), F(1, 31) = 1.14, ns, eta
2
 = .04. Indeed, high social anxiety participants 
who formed implementation intentions had a similar discrepancy between self- and 
observer-ratings of performance (M = 8.27, SD = 5.39) to that observed among low social 
anxiety participants (M = 8.08, SD = 5.31). 
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Discussion 
Experiment 4 investigated whether forming implementation intentions that 
specified how to direct attention if participants felt concerned during a speech task could 
promote more realistic appraisals of performance. Observer-ratings of performance did not 
differ between the conditions, yet people with high levels of social anxiety who did not 
form implementation intentions rated their performance as worse compared to participants 
with low levels of social anxiety. This finding supports Rapee and Hayman’s (1996, Study 
2) findings and suggests that, although people with high levels of social anxiety do not 
perform objectively worse than people with low levels of social anxiety, high anxious 
people systematically underestimate their performance relative to less anxious people. 
Forming goal intentions to try to remain calm did not influence appraisals of performance. 
We therefore asked participants to form implementation intentions to direct their attention 
in a particular manner when confronted by potential threat (““If I feel concerned, then I will 
focus on the back wall of the room!”) Directing attention in this manner should not 
influence objective ratings of performance (the target is the person’s focus of attention 
during the speech, not facets of their actual performance like content, structure, or speech 
clarity), but should prevent the shift of attention toward physiological cues that are 
indicative of social anxiety. Consistent with these ideas, forming an implementation 
intention promoted more positive (and thus more realistic) performance appraisals among 
people with high levels of social anxiety. This is an important finding because it speaks to 
the utility of implementation intentions in helping socially anxious individuals deal 
effectively with social evaluative situations in the real world; planning in this way not only 
prevents high levels of social anxiety from influencing attention to threat-related 
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information, but also helps people with high levels of social anxiety to realistically appraise 
their performance in social evaluative contexts.  
General Discussion 
A large body of evidence suggests that people with social anxiety display 
attentional biases that impair their performance in social situations and, ultimately, 
maintain their anxiety. Furthermore, these attentional responses are difficult to control. For 
example, in the present research, participants with high levels of social anxiety who were 
explicitly instructed that it was important to remain calm still showed biased responses to 
threat-related information. We hypothesised, however, that forming an implementation 
intention that specified a good opportunity to control attention (in the if-part of the plan) 
and a suitable response to execute when that opportunity was encountered (in the then-part 
of the plan) could help people to strategically direct their attention in social situations. Four 
experiments investigated this idea. 
Experiment 1 replicated Musa et al.’s (2003) findings showing that participants with 
high levels of social anxiety (relative to participants with low social anxiety) showed an 
attentional bias toward words representing social threat in the VDP. Experiment 1 also 
extended the work of Musa et al. by investigating the effect of forming respective goal 
intentions and implementation intentions on attentional responses. Findings showed that 
merely forming the goal intention to remain calm did not influence performance on the 
VDP. However, forming an if-then plan that specified how to remain calm (“If I see a 
neutral word, then I will focus all my attention on it!”) had an important effect on 
responses: High social anxiety participants who formed implementation intentions no 
longer exhibited biased responses to social threat information. In fact, attentional responses 
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were equivalent to those demonstrated by the low social anxiety group.  
Experiment 2 used an emotional spatial cuing paradigm based on the work of Fox et 
al. (2001) to investigate whether implementation intentions could promote rapid 
disengagement of attention from cues representing social threat. When participants were 
given no instructions about controlling attention, our findings replicated those obtained in 
previous research: Socially anxious participants dwelled for longer on social threat words 
compared to neutral words, even if they were explicitly instructed to remain calm and not 
to worry about the speech. However, high social anxiety participants who formed an 
implementation intention either to ignore the meaning of the words or to increase their 
readiness to switch attention were able to disengage as quickly from social threat words as 
they were from neutral words. Experiment 3 ruled out the possibility that the effects 
observed in Experiments 1 and 2 could be attributed simply to participants in the 
implementation intention conditions receiving more information about the tasks than 
participants in the other conditions. 
Experiment 4 investigated whether forming implementation intentions specifying 
how to deal with anxiety-related challenges that could occur during a speech task (e.g., how 
to direct attention if one feels concerned) could promote realistic ratings of performance. 
Following Rapee and Lim (1992), participants were asked to give a short speech and to rate 
their performance. Independent observers then rated videos of the speeches on the same 
performance dimensions. As expected, although observers did not rate speeches made by 
participants with high levels of social anxiety as any worse than those made by participants 
with low levels of social anxiety, participants with high levels of social anxiety 
underestimated their performance compared to participants with low levels of social 
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anxiety, even when they were told that they could keep calm by not focusing their attention 
on themselves during the speech. In other words, high levels of social anxiety led 
participants to underestimate their performance. However, participants who formed 
implementation intentions were more realistic about their performance (relative to 
participants who did not form implementation intentions). In summary, Experiments 1-4 
indicate that forming if-then plans helps people to direct their attention in social-evaluative 
contexts. By so doing, people with high levels of social anxiety are able to prevent their 
anxiety from influencing their responses to attentional tasks and appraisals of their 
performance. 
Implementation intentions are likely to have been effective in preventing social 
anxiety from influencing responses because this form of planning (a) spells out both a good 
opportunity in which to act and a response to the opportunity that will be instrumental in 
reaching one’s goal, and (b) makes execution of the response contingent upon the arrival of 
that opportunity, i.e., if (situation), then (goal-directed response). As a consequence, two 
processes are engendered that are not associated with merely holding strong goal intentions 
(Gollwitzer, 1999). First, the mental representation of the specified opportunity becomes 
highly accessible and this moment is therefore identified swiftly and accurately (Webb & 
Sheeran, 2004). Second, forming implementation intentions forges a strong association 
between the specified opportunity and the designated response (Webb & Sheeran, 2007; 
2008). This opportunity-response association obviates the need for conscious deliberation 
about both when to act and precisely how one should act at the critical moment, and means 
that the intended response is elicited relatively automatically (for a review see Gollwitzer & 
Sheeran, 2006). In terms of Experiment 3 of the present research then, participants who 
Implementation intentions and social anxiety     31 
formed an implementation intention that specified “If I see furniture…” were likely to have 
been fast to orient their attention toward furniture words. Once the opportunity (presence of 
furniture) was detected, the then-response (“then I will focus all my attention on it!”) is 
likely to have been initiated relatively automatically and before the learned anxious 
response (focus on social threat) could sway responses. In summary, by forming 
implementation intentions the effect of social anxiety on attention and judgment is 
attenuated because opportunities for the control of attention are quickly identified and 
strongly linked to functional responses.  
It may be useful to conceptualise the control of attention in social anxiety in terms 
of models of task performance in other domains. For example, the QUAD model (Conrey, 
Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005) distinguishes between several 
processes that can influence implicit task performance. The first process concerns the 
likelihood that an automatic bias is activated by a stimulus. In the context of social anxiety, 
this process would be reflected in the likelihood that a threat-related stimulus (e.g., the 
word ‘criticise’) evokes the automatic tendency to direct attention toward that stimulus. In 
the present studies, respective implementation intentions were not geared at this process. 
Rather, we assumed that high social anxiety participants who formed implementation 
intentions still possessed the tendency to direct their attention toward threat. However, 
forming implementation intentions is likely to have influenced two other determinants of 
task performance identified by the QUAD model. The first is the probability that a correct 
response can be determined. By forming implementation intentions the person has 
specified, in advance, a suitable response to a particular stimulus (e.g., the presence of 
word stimuli). As a consequence, the person is better able to select a functional response 
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(e.g., focus on the neutral stimulus). Second, forming implementation intentions should 
have influenced the likelihood that the automatic bias can be overcome. This process can 
be construed in terms of the likelihood that the wanted response (e.g., focus on furniture) 
replaces the unwanted response (i.e., attend to social threat). Implementation intentions that 
link the desired response to the specified opportunity (“If I see furniture, then I will focus 
all my attention on it!”) strategically automate the execution of the wanted response 
(Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998) and thus increase the likelihood that the individual is able to 
overcome the effect of social anxiety on responses. In summary, it seems likely that 
implementation intention formation did not prevent or interfere with the processes that 
produce biased attentional responses, but rather constituted a self-regulatory tool to prevent 
social anxiety from influencing attention and judgment. Future research could be directed 
towards testing these predictions and towards assessing whether implementation intentions 
can be used to prevent the automatic activation of bias. 
Future research might also consider whether and how implementation intentions 
could be integrated with existing interventions designed to help people experiencing high 
levels of social anxiety. Implementation intentions are a relatively quick and cost-effective 
intervention. In the present studies, as in many other implementation intention studies, the 
intervention was delivered via written instructions that required relatively little time and 
effort on the part of the participant. Implementation intentions are also flexible (Gollwitzer 
et al., 2007) and can be tailored to the particular contexts that are problematic (Achtziger et 
al., 2008). For example, implementation intentions might profitably be targeted at contexts 
where the person with high levels of social anxiety struggles to initiate goal striving (e.g., 
to start speaking) or contexts in which goal striving is derailed by threats that originate 
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within the person (e.g., feelings of concern) or in the social context (e.g., a critical face in 
the audience). It would also be interesting to investigate whether using implementation 
intentions to direct attention toward neutral aspects of the environment could influence 
interpretative biases in social anxiety (Constans, Penn, Ihen, & Hope, 1999). In short, 
implementation intentions have a number of advantages as an intervention strategy that 
recommend their use either as a ‘stand-alone’ intervention or integrated with other 
interventions. 
Implementation intentions and social anxiety     34 
References 
Achtziger, A., Gollwitzer, P. M., & Sheeran, P. (2008). Implementation intentions and 
shielding goal striving from unwanted thoughts and feelings. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 34, 381-393. 
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 50, 179-211. 
Alden, L. E., & Wallace, S. T. (1995). Social phobia and social appraisal in successful and 
unsuccessful social interactions. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33, 497-506. 
Amir, N., Elias, J., Klumpp, H., & Przeworski, A. (2003). Attentional bias to threat in 
social phobia: Facilitating processing of threat or difficulty disengaging attention 
from threat? Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41, 1325-1335. 
Bargh, J. A. (1994). The four horsemen of automaticity: Awareness, efficiency, intention 
and control in social cognition. In R. S. Wyer, Jr., & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook 
of social cognition (2
nd
 Ed., pp. 1-40). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Bar-Haim, Y., Lamy, D., Pergamin, L., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J., & van Ijzendoorn, 
M. H. (2007). Threat-related attentional bias in anxious and non-anxious 
individuals: A meta-analytic study. Psychological Bulletin, 133, 1-24. 
Bögels, S. M., & Mansell, W. (2004). Attention processes in the maintenance and treatment 
of social phobia: Hypervigilance, avoidance and self-focused attention. Clinical 
Psychology Review, 24, 827-856. 
Chen, Y. P., Ehlers, A., Clark, D. M., & Mansell, W. (2002). Patients with generalized 
social phobia direct their attention away from faces. Behaviour Research  and 
Therapy, 40, 677-687. 
Implementation intentions and social anxiety     35 
Clark, D. M., & Wells, A. (1995). A cognitive model of social phobia. In R. G. Heimberg, 
M. Liebowitz, D. Hope, & F. Schneider (Eds.), Social phobia: Diagnosis, 
assessment, and treatment (pp. 69-93). New York: Guilford.  
Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. Psychological Bulletin, 112, 155-159. 
Conrey, F. R., Sherman, J. W., Gawronski, B., Hugenberg, K., & Groom, C. J. (2005). 
Separating multiple processes in implicit social cognition: The QUAD model of 
implicit task performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 469-
487. 
Constans, J. I., Penn, D. L., Ihen, G. H., & Hope, D. A. (1999). Interpretive biases for 
ambiguous stimuli in social anxiety. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 643-
651. 
Fox, E., Russo, R., Bowles, R., & Dutton, K. (2001). Do threatening stimuli draw or hold 
visual attention in subclinical anxiety? Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 130, 681-700. 
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1993). Goal achievement: The role of intentions. European Review of 
Social Psychology, 4, 141-185. 
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1999). Implementation intentions: Strong effects of simple plans. 
American Psychologist, 54, 493-503. 
Gollwitzer, P. M., & Schaal, B. (1998). Meta-cognition in action: The importance of 
implementation intentions. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2, 124-136. 
Gollwitzer, P. M., & Sheeran, P. (2006). Implementation intentions and goal achievement: 
A meta-analysis of effects and processes. Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology, 38, 69-120. 
Implementation intentions and social anxiety     36 
Gollwitzer, P. M., Parks-Stamm, E., Jaudas, A., & Sheeran, P. (2007). Flexible tenacity in 
goal pursuit. In J. Shah & W. Gardner (Eds.), Handbook of motivation science (pp. 
325-341). New York: Guilford. 
Gotlib, I. H., & McCann, C. D. (1984). Construct accessibility and depression: An 
examination of cognitive and affective factors. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 47, 427-439. 
Hope, D. A., Rapee, R. M., Heimberg, R. G., & Dombeck, M. (1990). Representations of 
the self in social phobia: Vulnerability to social threat. Cognitive Therapy and 
Research, 14, 177-189. 
Lang, P., & Öhman, D. V. (1988). The International Affective Picture System 
[photographic slides]. Technical report, The Center for Research in 
Psychophysiology, University of Florida, Gainsville, FL. 
MacLeod, C., Mathews, A., & Tata, P. (1986). Attentional bias in emotional disorders. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 95, 15-20. 
Mansell, W., Clark, D. M., & Ehlers, A. (2003). Internal versus external attention in social 
anxiety: An investigation using a novel paradigm. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 41, 555-572. 
Mansell, W., Clark, D. M., Ehlers, A., & Chen, Y. P. (1999). Social anxiety and attention 
away from emotional faces. Cognition and Emotion, 13, 673-690. 
Mogg, K., & Bradley, B. P. (2002). Selective orienting of attention to masked threat faces 
in social anxiety. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40, 1403-1414. 
Implementation intentions and social anxiety     37 
Musa, C., Lepine, J. P., Clark, D. M., Mansell, W., & Ehlers, A. (2003). Selective attention 
in social phobia and the moderating effect of a concurrent depressive disorder. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41, 1043-1054. 
Oettingen, G., Hönig, G., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (2000). Effective self-regulation of goal 
attainment. International Journal of Educational Research, 33, 705-732. 
Ononaiye, M., Turpin, G., & Reidy, J. (2007). Attentional bias in social anxiety: 
Manipulation of stimulus duration and social-evaluative anxiety. Cognitive Therapy 
and Research, 31, 727-740. 
Paul, G. (1966). Insight versus desensitization in psychotherapy: An experiment in anxiety 
reduction. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Rapee, R. M., & Hayman, K. (1996). The effects of video feedback on the self-evaluation 
of performance in socially anxious subjects. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 34, 
315-322. 
Rapee, R. M., & Lim, L. (1992). Discrepancy between self- and observer ratings of 
performance in social phobics. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 101, 728-731. 
Rapee, R. M., Gaston, J. E., & Abbott, M. J. (2009). Testing the efficacy of theoretically 
derived improvements in the treatment of social phobia. Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology, 77, 317-327. 
Salemink, E., van den Hout, M. A., & Kindt, M. (2007). Selective attention and threat: 
Quick orienting versus slow disengagement and two versions of the dot probe task. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45, 607-615. 
Schaal, B., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (1997). Implementation intentions and resistance to 
temptation. Unpublished manuscript, University of Konstanz, Germany. 
Implementation intentions and social anxiety     38 
Schweiger-Gallo, I., Keil, A., McCulloch, K. C., Rockstroh, B., & Gollwitzer, P. M. 
(2009). Strategic automation of emotion regulation. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 96, 11-31. 
Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, R. L., Lushene, R. E., Vagg, P. R., & Jacobs, G. A. (1983). 
Manual for the state-trait anxiety inventory. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting 
Psychologists Press. 
Watson, D., & Friend, R. (1969). Measurement of socio-evaluative anxiety. Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 33, 448-457. 
Webb, T. L., & Sheeran, P. (2003).  Can implementation intentions help to overcome ego-
depletion?  Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39, 279-286. 
Webb, T. L., & Sheeran, P. (2004). Identifying good opportunities to act: Implementation 
intentions and cue discrimination.  European Journal of Social Psychology, 34, 
407-419. 
Webb, T. L., & Sheeran, P. (2006). Does changing behavioral intentions engender behavior 
change? A meta-analysis of the experimental evidence. Psychological Bulletin, 132, 
249-268. 
Webb, T. L., & Sheeran, P. (2007). How do implementation intentions promote goal 
attainment?  A test of component processes. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 43, 295-302. 
Webb, T. L., & Sheeran, P. (2008). Mechanisms of implementation intention effects: The 
role of goal intentions, self-efficacy, and accessibility of plan components. British 
Journal of Social Psychology, 47, 373-395. 
Implementation intentions and social anxiety     39 
Wenzel, A. (2006). Attentional disruption in the presence of negative automatic thoughts. 
Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 34, 385-395. 
Wikström, J., Lundh, L. G., & Westerland, J. (2003). Stroop effects for masked threat 
words: Pre-attentive or selective awareness? Cognition and Emotion, 17, 827-842. 
Yiend, J., & Mathews, A. (2001). Anxiety and attention to threatening pictures. Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 54A, 665-681. 
Implementation intentions and social anxiety     40 
Footnotes 
1
 In each experiment we checked that low social anxiety participants scored lower 
on all measures of anxiety (SAD, FNE, PRCS, and STAI-T) than did the high social 
anxiety participants. As expected, all the comparisons were significant, F(3, 48) = 12.66, p 
< .001, eta
2
 = .44 (Experiment 1), F(4, 149) = 33.19, p < .001, eta
2
 = .47 (Experiment 2), 
F(4, 57) = 23.75, p < .001, eta
2
 = .63 (Experiment 3), and F(4, 68) = 14.57, p < .001, eta
2
 = 
.46 (Experiment 4).  We also checked that the low and high social anxiety groups did not 
differ in either age or the proportion of female participants. Consistent with this idea, in 
each experiment the comparisons were non significant, F(2, 55) = 1.31, ns, eta
2
 = .05 
(Experiment 1), F(2, 155) = 1.73, ns, eta
2
 = .02 (Experiment 2), F(2, 65) = 0.33, ns, eta
2
 = 
.01 (Experiment 3), F(2, 72) = 0.77, ns, eta
2
 = .02 (Experiment 4). Finally, we checked 
whether the high social anxiety groups differed on the anxiety measures on arrival at the 
laboratory. In each experiment, there was no difference between the high social anxiety 
groups, F(6, 68) = 0.88, ns, eta
2
 = .07 (Experiment 1), F(12, 213) = 0.92, ns, eta
2
 = .05 
(Experiment 2), F(8, 86) = 0.79, ns, eta
2
 = .07 (Experiment 3), and F(8, 100) = 0.27, ns, 
eta
2
 = .02 (Experiment 4). Note that the SAD was not given to participants on arrival in 
Experiment 1 and so the analyses for Experiment 1 are based on the FNE, PRCS, and 
STAI-T only. 
2
 It is worth noting that the threat versus neutral words differ in another respect; 
syntactic category. Although some of the threat words were nouns (e.g., failure, nausea), 
most threat words were adjectives whereas most neutral words were nouns. Although it is 
difficult to see how this potential confound could account for differences between low and 
high socially anxious participants (high, relative to low, socially anxious participants are 
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unlikely to show an attentional bias for adjectives rather than nouns), it is possible that 
participants might have used the syntactic category of the words as an additional means to 
implement their intentions. Future research should try to construct word lists that 
systematically match the syntactic category of threat and neutral terms. 
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Appendix 1 
List of Words Used in Experiment 1 
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Appendix 2 
List of Words Used in Experiment 2 
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Appendix 3 
List of Words Used in Experiment 3 







































Attentional Bias Scores for Threat Trials by Condition (Experiment 1) 
 
Figure 2 




Attentional Bias Scores for Threat Trials by Condition (Experiment 3) 
 
Figure 4 
Self- and Observer-Ratings of Performance by Condition (Experiment 4) 
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Mean response latencies by condition when the probe replaces the threat word 
 
LpLt 556 524 519 542 
UpUt 557 524 520 564 
 
Mean response latencies by condition when the probe replaces the neutral word 
 
LpUt 550 544 524 541 
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p < .05 p < .05 
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Mean response latencies by condition when the probe replaces the threat word 
 
LpLt 543 517 552 529 
UpUt 542 528 547 554 
 
Mean response latencies by condition when the probe replaces the furniture word 
 
LpUt 536 530 557 526 
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